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DOING MORE THAN REMEMBERING
THE NINTH AMENDMENT
MORRIS

S.

ARNOLD*

The recent revival of interest in the ninth amendment is partly due
to dissatisfaction with the intrusive bureaucratic state created in this
country over the last fifty years. The ninth amendment is, of course, a
fairly obvious place to look for protection from the ravages of positivism,
for it holds out at least a modicum of hope to those who value liberty and
autonomy-those, that is, who would like to locate in the Constitution
something like a general right to be left alone. Such people used to be
called liberals, but that label has ironically been appropriated by persons
with a social vision which requires massive coercion to effect and maintain it. This coercion appears in a large number of forms, but most frequently it manifests itself in two ways: first, in interventionist statutes
that prohibit the enforcement of some contracts or compel the creation of
others; and second, in takings and redistributions of wealth that have
rendered the promise of just compensation held out in the fifth and fourteenth amendments a virtual dead letter. Since the possibility of enforcement is what often, though by no means always, induces obedience to
law, guns and jails lurk behind these laws, however subtle may be the
camouflage, and however worthy their progenitors think them to be.
Much recent ninth amendment scholarship is generated by a desire to
find some sanctuary from what is perceived as majoritarian tyranny.
Professor Sager's finely tuned arguments aimed at helping us understand what the ninth amendment might mean raise every plausible possibility and, indeed (deliberately) one or two implausible possibilities as
well.I It is a most sophisticated addition to the literature which, though
contributors to it have exhibited remarkable energy and creativity, is rapidly exhausting the subject. However, to one who has recently fallen
from grace, that is, has assumed a judgment seat in the real world after
fifteen years as an academic lawyer, it is a little troubling to conclude, as
Professor Sager does, that what we can mainly do with the ninth amendment is remember it. I no longer have the luxury of musing luxuriantly
* U.S. District Court Judge, Western District of Arkansas. B.S.E.E., LL.B., University of
Arkansas; LL.M., S.J.D., Harvard Law School.
1. Sager, You Can Raise the First, Hide Behind the Fourth, and Pleadthe Fifth. But What on
Earth Can You Do with the Ninth Amendment?, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 239 (1988) (Professor
Sager's article appears in this symposium issue).
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over cases. Real people have real cases that require decision, and deciding real cases requires a court to give content to words if it can. I shall
therefore try to answer the question posed by Professor Sager's title in a
slightly different way.
I
At the risk of appearing tendentious, it would seem right to begin
with the observation that the ninth amendment means what it says and
that it was included in the Constitution simply to prevent the Bill of
Rights from triggering the maxim inclusio unius. Having said that, another observation is in order: There is little anxiety in the eighteenthcentury sources about where judges and others were supposed to look to
discover what the rights protected by the ninth amendment were. To the
modern mind this creates a real puzzle. That it does so is attributable to
the positivistic character of modern legal systems and to our doctrine of
stare decisis (not well established in the eighteenth century) which combine to make us uneasy about reaching conclusions that are not readily
attributable to some legislative or judicial text. The notion that law
could be discovered in custom or usage or simply by the application of
moral minds to facts is not one with which the twentieth century is very
comfortable, but moral skepticism was not a characteristic of eighteenthcentury republicanism. Another possible explanation for the lack of
guidance provided us as to the content of the ninth amendment is that
the revolutionary generation had not completely thought through what
the amendment meant because the practice of judicial review was not all
that firmly established. It is certain, of course, that that generation
would not have asked itself immediately, as we would, what a court
would do with a proposed constitutional text, because the Constitution
was not thought of as belonging exclusively or even primarily to one
branch of the government, and, moreover, the power of courts to transform societies had not yet been experienced. Lastly, in attempting to
understand the vagueness of the ninth amendment, it is well to remember
that, at least among that class of persons who were likely to hold power
in the government, there was a very general agreement about what government was for and therefore about what individual rights in fact existed. We are dealing with a time in which the way that a moral world
was ordered was regarded almost as a palpable fact. This cultural homogeneity, of course, can be easily exaggerated, but its existence explains a
number of legal phenomena, such as the great power of eighteenth-cen-
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tury juries and the almost total lack of jury-control devices in colonial
America.
There is nothing even approaching a homogeneity of opinion today
on what individual rights deserve recognition or on, what is the same
thing, the proper role of government in our people's social and economic
lives. Indeed, we do not even agree on whether it is useful or honest or
logically possible to differentiate between our social and economic lives.
This is due, in large measure, to the extension of political power to
classes excluded from participation in government in the eighteenth century. It says nothing about the abstract merits of a person's politics to
observe that the extent of his or her devotion, to, say, contract and property as ordering moral principles is likely to depend somewhat on that
person's economic and social position. But whoever may be right, the
accession of large numbers of persons to full political rights has made it
difficult, if not impossible, for the time being at least, to recapture the day
when there was a consensus about what natural law means. This may
lead to the somewhat gloomy conclusion that while the ninth amendment, as a technical legal matter, must mean something, it cannot, as a
practical matter, mean anything.
It might be argued that the inability to reach consensus on the content of natural law does not prevent a court from resorting to it to decide
cases. After all, judges do not agree with each other now on the meaning
of texts, so disagreement over natural law could hardly disqualify it as a
source for decisions. This argument has some force, and it is also well to
remember that natural law principles might plausibly be found not only
in custom and usage or in moral rumination but also in statutes and state
or colonial constitutions. 2 But it would be wrong to attempt to reconstruct what natural law meant in the eighteenth century and pretend that
that version of natural law is enshrined in the ninth amendment. There
are many reasons that this is impracticable, but the most fundamental is
that while natural law is immutable, people's understanding of it can improve, and it can be revealed that a previous appreciation of its content
was erroneous. One's comprehension of natural law, in other words, is
capable of evolution. As a modest example of the kind of evolutionary
process that I mean, let us take a look at the amendment immediately
previous to the ninth, the eighth, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. It commands us not to inflict cruel and unusual punishment,
but it does not say that we are bound by the revolutionary generation's
2. See Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127 (1987) for an
excellent development of this and other ideas.
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view of what is cruel and unusual. It tells us not to be cruel in an absolute, Platonic sense. In other words, we are bound to do as the framers
said, not as they did. The same argument can easily be transported into
cases invoking the ninth amendment.
Even if we cannot have natural law back, we can give meaning to
the ninth amendment, without giving it any particular content, by ascribing to it a kind of supplementary role. The ninth amendment can usefully serve as a directive that rights ought to be taken seriously. It is
altogether plausible to take the position that the ninth amendment serves
as a direction to us to adopt a broad view and liberal construction of the
first eight amendments and to regard the personal liberties enumerated
there as deserving the most meticulous, fastidious, and expansive protection. At the very least, this would mean that in doubtful cases the balance ought to be struck against the existence of governmental power. A
judicious use of the amendment in this way could create a constitutional
jurisprudence which sees government powers "as islands surrounded by a
sea of individual rights" rather than seeing "rights as islands surrounded
by a sea of government powers."' 3 Such a role for the ninth amendment
could radically alter the outcome of many cases. It at least satisfies the
need to give meaning to everything in the Constitution, not to mention
the duty to defend freedom.

3. S.

MACEDO, THE NEW RIGHT V. THE CONSTITUTION 27

(1986).

